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The paper investigates the wage assimilation of foreign immigrants and internal 
migrants in Italy, comparing them with stayers. Control for selection in out-migration is 
performed using a new duration version of the Heckman correction and taking into 
account both return migration and moves to other destinations.  
Internal migrants experience only minor wage differences when compared with stayers. 
By contrast, foreign immigrants earn about 8% less than stayers and internal migrants at 
the beginning of their careers, and the wage gap increases over time. Both language 
distance and job segmentation contribute to immigrants’ lack of wage assimilation. 
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Understanding the mechanisms underlying immigrant assimilation – defined as 
disappearing differences between groups over time (Alba & Nee, 1997) – is of the 
upmost importance for destination countries, in avoiding potential welfare costs and 
intra-group tensions. Wage assimilation is only one of the steps in the integration 
process, but it has strategic relevance, and policies to improve it are considered 
fundamental. This paper analyses the wage assimilation of immigrants in Italy and 
contributes to the debate in several ways, by (i) comparing foreign immigrants, internal 
migrants and native stayers; (ii) modelling a new duration version of the Heckman 
correction and taking into account both return migration and moves to other 
destinations; (iii) investigating the role of linguistic distance; and (iv) exploring the role 
of job segmentation. 
Italy is a country of recent immigration
1
 from different countries of origin and 
with a long experience of internal mobility. This peculiarity makes the country an 
interesting case study for examining the wage assimilation of foreign immigrants 
relative to stayers and investigating the role of the linguistic distance of immigrants’ 
native languages to Italian. In addition, it is possible to explore the assimilation process 
for internal migrants, who, unlike foreign immigrants, know the language spoken at 
their destination (and have zero linguistic distance) and share most of the social rules of 
the destination region. 
Based on an Italian administrative dataset on dependent employment (the Work 
Histories Italian Panel, WHIP), the analysis shows that internal migrants experience 
only minor wage differences from stayers. By contrast, foreign immigrants earn about 
8% less than stayers and internal migrants at the beginning of their career. Over a 
lifetime, the wage profile of immigrants diverges from the wage profiles of natives, both 
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internal migrants and stayers. Controlling for positive selection in out-migration 
(foreign workers with lower skills are the most likely to remain in Italy) yields the same 
results. In addition, linguistic distance worsens the wage assimilation of immigrants, but 
it is far from explaining the entire gap. Lastly, the under-assimilation of foreign 
immigrants largely depends on labour market segmentation: immigrants do not 
assimilate because they are mainly employed in sectors with no career progression. 
However, language proximity favours exits from jobs of this kind. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First, a brief history of migration in 
Italy (section 2) and a review of the assimilation literature (section 3) are presented. A 
description of the data (section 4) and the empirical strategy (section 5) follow. The 
main results are presented in section 6, and section 7 explores the role of job 
segmentation. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
2. Historical background 
Italy has a long tradition of internal migration from less-developed areas to the richest 
parts of the country (Appendix Figure A1a). Large flows took place in the 1960s from 
the South and the North-East towards the North-West; they declined at the end of the 
1970s, and then acquired new strength in the second half of the 1990s, especially from 
the South towards the North-East (Appendix Figure A2). 
Differentials in per capita GDP and in unemployment rates were the main 
driving factors in South-to-North mobility (Fachin, 2007; Piras, 2012). Meanwhile, high 
mobility costs, mismatches in the labour market and the North-South housing price 
differential dampened down mobility (Attanasio & Padoa-Schioppa, 1991; Cannari, 
Nucci, & Sestito, 2000; Faini, Galli, Gennari, & Rossi, 1997).  
More recently, Italy has become increasingly important as a destination country 
for foreign immigrants (Appendix Figure A1b). At the end of the 1970s, Italy’s first 
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immigrants arrived from North Africa, Latin America and the Philippines. With the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, inflows also began from Eastern Europe. By 2016, immigrants 
represented 8.3% of the population; 59% of them are located in the North, 25% in the 
Centre and only 16% in the South (Istat, 2016). In general, they hold unskilled jobs: 
men usually work in construction, agriculture and manufacturing, while women mainly 
work in services, especially household services. 
The effect of foreign immigration on South–North internal flows has been 
analysed by Mocetti and Porello (2010) and Brűcker, Fachin, and Venturini (2011), who 
found that immigrant concentration in the northern regions has partially substituted the 
traditional South–North mobility of the less-skilled natives. These results are consistent 
with research showing that, more recently, the propensity to migrate internally increases 
with education level and academic performance (Fratesi & Percoco, 2013; Marinelli, 
2012). 
3. Literature review 
The economic literature on immigrant wage assimilation began with the pioneering 
work of Chiswick (1978) and the seminal contributions by Borjas (1985) for the US, 
later extended to Europe in several national studies (e.g. Dustmann & Van Soest, 2002; 
Nielsen, Rosholm, Smith, & Husted, 2004; Venturini & Villosio, 2008). 
Scholars typically use a standard wage equation with a human capital approach, 
specified by distinguishing the role of an immigrant’s education and experience before 
and after arrival and proficiency in the language of the destination. Chiswick (1991) 
first found that knowledge of the native language was crucial for assimilation; this was 
confirmed by Dustmann and Fabbri (2003) and by Chiswick and Miller (2015). 
Other relevant variables in explaining different patterns of economic 
assimilation include labour market conditions at entrance, which determine workers’ 
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future prospects (Rosholm, Scott, & Husted, 2006), and migrant networks (Borjas, 
1992; Cutler & Glaeser, 1997; Hatton and Leigh, 2011), which can exert a positive or a 
negative effect (Danzer & Yaman, 2013; De Palo, Faini, & Venturini, 2007; Dustmann 
& Van Soest, 2002). 
Finally, assimilation also depends on the characteristics of immigrants who 
remain in the destination country, who may represent the ‘best and brightest’ of their 
initial group or the opposite (Borjas, 1985; Borjas & Bratsberg, 1996; Dustmann, 1996; 
Mayr & Peri, 2009). If those who remain belong to the higher (lower) tail of the wage 
distribution, the empirical estimates of assimilation will be biased upwards 
(downwards) and will be inconsistent. Thus, modelling the return migration decision is 
a fundamental first step to control for the presence of selection bias in the wage 
assimilation (Dustmann, 1996). The return migration decision has usually been 
modelled as a function of income differentials (Constant & Massey, 2003; Dustmann, 
2003), social ties (De Haas & Fokkema, 2011) or economic prospects in the countries of 
origin (Mansoor & Quillin, 2007; Venturini & Villosio, 2008). 
Research on Italy, using different data sources, has shown that foreign 
immigrants do not assimilate to natives (Dell’Aringa, Lucifora, & Pagani, 2015; Fullin 
& Reyneri, 2011; Venturini & Villosio, 2008), but it has failed to explain why 
assimilation does not take place. According to the sociological literature, internal 
migrants have experienced poor economic and social assimilation (e.g. Fofi, 1975; 
Pugliese, 2006), but there is no econometric evidence for this assertion. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, methodologically, 
it models a new duration version of the Heckman correction (Heckman, 1979) to control 
for selective out-migration back to the country of origin or onwards to other 
destinations. For the Italian case, Venturini and Villosio (2008) also corrected for 
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remigration, but only to the country of origin and without using the duration version. 
Meanwhile, Dell’Aringa et al. (2015), relying on cross-sectional data, were unable to 
correct for out-migration. 
Second, the paper investigates the role of the linguistic distance of foreign 
immigrants’ native languages to Italian in explaining wage assimilation patterns. This is 
a novelty in studies on Italy. 
Third, the paper compares the wage profiles of foreign immigrants, internal 
migrants and stayers, providing new insights into the assimilation process. Although the 
first two groups may share some difficulties (in social integration, under-recognition of 
education level or prejudice, etc.), internal migrants are definitely advantaged in terms 
of language skills (with zero linguistic distance), communication skills and cultural 
background, and their migratory experience is likely to be dissimilar to that of foreign 
immigrants. Thus, immigrants are different from both stayers and internal migrants. 
Still, considering the three groups is useful: it empirically tests whether the under-
assimilation of internal migrants – as described in the sociological literature – has been 
confirmed in recent years and in terms of wages; it also enables an analysis of the 
assimilation process of both internal migrants and immigrants. 
Finally, the paper also explores the role of job segmentation in foreign 
immigrant wage assimilation, adding evidence to the existing literature, among which, 
notably, Dell’Aringa et al. (2015) investigated the role of human capital characteristics 
in job segmentation. This paper analyses instead the role of job segmentation in wage 
formation and the importance of linguistic proximity in exiting from low-wage jobs. 
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
The only longitudinal dataset that allows for the study of wage assimilation is WHIP.
2
 
WHIP is a 1% sample of individuals who have worked in Italy from 1985 to 2004, 
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based on Italian social security (INPS) archives.
3
 It allows distinctions between foreign 
immigrants, internal migrants and stayers; it is very rich in workers’ and job details and 
it provides information on employers. 
The analysis is restricted to the WHIP section concerning dependent 
employment in the private sector from 1990 to 2003. The years 1985–89 have been 
excluded because the number of foreign workers was too small to perform reliable 
estimates, and 2004 has been removed because information on firms was not provided. 
The focus is restricted to male private employees aged 18–45, to compare 
immigrants with the most homogeneous group of Italian workers. Women have been 
excluded since they are largely employed in the public sector (natives) and in household 
services (immigrants), which are not covered by WHIP.
4
 Moreover, studies on family 
migration describe female migrants to Italy in that period as followers in the migratory 
process and as secondary workers.
5
 
WHIP does not cover public sector employees (17% of total employment), self-
employed workers (22%), workers in the agricultural sector (5%) or domestic workers 
(4.8%). These limitations are not crucial in understanding male foreigners’ assimilation, 
because Italian legislation limits access to public employment to Italian or other EU 
citizens
6
 and self-employment accounted for only 2% among foreign work in 2004.  
A further issue is the lack of information about education. Individual fixed 
effects, which are included in the analysis, control for unobserved heterogeneity, and 
thus also for education, as long as it is fixed over time. However, it is not possible to 
isolate the effect of education on wage assimilation.  
In addition, the dataset does not provide information on the year of arrival of 
immigrants. Yet, given that the focus is on working-age men, migrating for work 
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purposes, the authors’ interest is on the year of entrance into the labour market, proxied 
with the first legal enrolment in WHIP.
7
  
Finally, it is not possible to control for whether immigrants worked in (or move 
to) the informal economy or if they move to unemployment. Notably, Bijwaard, 
Schluter, and Wahba (2014) showed that once immigrants exit the labour market, they 
are also likely to leave the country (see also Venturini, 2004). Moreover, if the informal 
economy were also covered, wage assimilation may be even lower, because immigrants 
earn less.  
The workers are divided into the following groups: (i) stayers, referring to 
Italian workers who are employed in the geographical area of their birth; (ii) internal 
migrants, comprising Italian workers employed in a different area; and (iii) foreign-born 
immigrants, covering workers born abroad (referred to as ‘foreign immigrants’ for the 
sake of brevity). To identify internal migrants four macro areas of origin and destination 
are used: the North-West, North-East, Centre and South. This strategy eliminates, as far 
as possible, commuting workers and reflects the Italian experience of internal migrants 
as long-distance migrants. Also, each area has a different level of attractiveness, given 
its specific economic structure. Immigrants are selected using place of birth. Since 
WHIP does not contain information on nationality, workers born in Western Europe 
(the EU-15), in the main industrialised countries, in Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela 
have been excluded. This is to avoid counting Italians born abroad or emigrants’ 
descendants among immigrants. Anyway, they represent only 1.25% of the original 
sample. 
The descriptive statistics show that immigrants’ average wages in 1990–2003 
were 17% lower than those of stayers and 22% lower than those of internal migrants 
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(Appendix Table A1). Such wage differentials are, in large part, due to the different 
characteristics of workers in the three groups.
8
 
Although small firms dominate the Italian economy, internal migrants are more 
likely than the other groups to work for large firms, which drove Italian development 
throughout the 1960s. They are mainly employed in the North-West, an industrial area 
that attracted workers from all over the country during those years. Conversely, foreign 
immigrants are more likely to work in very small firms, which dominated economic 
development during the 1980s and 1990s, and are concentrated in both the North-West 
and the North-East – areas that were booming when they first arrived. Blue-collar 
employment dominates in all groups, but for immigrants it represents over 90% of total 
employment. Additionally, immigrants are over-represented in the construction sector. 
5. Empirical strategy 
5.1. The model 
The authors follow the traditional human capital model adopted by Chiswick (1978), 
and subsequently refined (e.g. Borjas, 1985; Dustmann, 1996; Dustmann & Van Soest, 
2002). 
The dependent variable  is the log weekly wage of individual  at time . It is 
a function of work experience , other individual time-variant variables , the 
worker’s job characteristics , macroeconomic conditions 	
 (which affect both the 
region  and the sector  where the workers are employed), the size of the migrant’s 
community  in the destination region 
 (when appropriate) and individual fixed 
effects , which capture unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. 
  = , , , 	
, 
;  +   (1) 
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where  ∙ is assumed to be a linear function of the variables mentioned above and   
is normally distributed with zero mean and it is independent from the variables inside 
 ∙. 
The wage equation is estimated separately for the three groups of workers. For 
internal migrants the estimated wage equation is the following one, while for stayers it 
does not include 
: 
  =  +  +    +   +  + 	
! + 
" + #
 + $ +  (2) 
with region (#
 and sector fixed effects ($, and an idiosyncratic error component . 
, …" are the parameters to be estimated with OLS. The parameters of main interest 
are returns to experience and to age, to see if wages converge over time. However, all 
the parameters enter into the determination of wage profiles. 
For foreign immigrants, wage equation (2) is augmented by a variable capturing 
linguistic distance and by a correction for out-migration, both detailed below. Despite 
the introduction of individual fixed effects and correction for selection in out-migration, 
one should keep in mind that these results may not have a causal interpretation, if there 
are unobserved characteristics which vary over time and affect migrant assimilation. 
To control for language proficiency, which has been shown to be an important 
element in migrant assimilation, linguistic distance %, interacted with work experience 
, is added to equation (2) (further details in section 5.2) 
In addition, controls for endogenous selection in return migration are needed to 
avoid possible biases from the existence of a systematic link between the decision to 
stay and labour market outcomes. If this is the case, in fact, even fixed effect estimates 
may give biased parameter estimates. As mentioned in section 3, a number of studies 
have dealt with this issue, modelling the probability of staying in the host countries as a 
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function of individual characteristics and exclusion restrictions, and then including the 
inverse Mills ratio (IMR) in the wage equation (Heckman correction). 
The contribution of this paper is to extend the traditional Heckman correction 
element in the wage equation with a duration version of this correction, to this end 
denoted DIMR. The length of stay for individual  in the labour market of the 
destination country is denoted &', where ( is the year when the individual entered the 
formal labour market. In this sample, the individual is observed at year . Thus: 
 &' ≥  − ( (3) 
where  − (  corresponds to the sum of spells spent in employment and out of 
employment. +&' is a linear function of some observed variables , that are assumed 
to have an impact on out-migration, as follows: 
 +&' = ,- + . (4) 
 , includes all the control variables of the wage equation, as well as the GDP growth 
rates at time  in the origin country and in other potential destination countries. The last 
two variables represent job opportunities in other countries and are not present in the 
wage equation, serving as exclusion restrictions. The random term . is assumed to be 
normally distributed with zero mean and variance /. - is a vector of coefficients that 
have to be estimated. 
The reason for controlling for selection is that there could be a correlation 
between the unobserved and random term in the wage equation  and the random term 
.  that has an impact on the length of stay and hence on the selection of individuals 
observed in the sample at year . Remember that wages are observed only for those who 
are still in the country at year . The next step, therefore, is to calculate the expected 
value of the error term in the wage equation, , conditional on the individual being in 
the country at year ,  0|&' ≥  − (. This conditional expectation is what should 
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be included in the wage equation to control for selection. As alluded to above, it is 
denoted DIMR. If &' ≥  − (, then individual  has not out-migrated at year  and he 
is still in the sample. 
Let 2 denote the p.d.f. of the standard normal distribution and Φ the 
corresponding c.d.f.  
Note that due to the normality assumption  =  4. + 5, where 5 is 
normally distributed and independent of . , and where 4 is the correlation coefficient. 
Let 17 8 denote the indicator function. Then, for any real number 9: 








 /42@>  (5) 
From (5) the DIMR is obtained: 
 0|. > 9 = /4 F@ >⁄ HI@ >⁄   (6) 
Consequently, it follows that: 
0|&' >  − ( = 0JK+&' > + − (L = /4 
FMNJ=OP<LOQ<=RE S
HMINJ=OP<LOQ<=RE S




  (7) 
Let DIMR be denoted V and it is given by 




The wage equation (2) for immigrants is thus augmented by V: 
 =  +  +  +  +  + 	
! + 
" + 
 +% ∗ X + VY + #
 + $ + Z  (9) 
As seen from (8), / and 4 cannot be estimated separately. In (9) Y = /4. Note that 
individual fixed effects are included in the wage equation, but not in selection terms. 
When estimating the model, + − ( is represented by a linear function of 
months of employment and months out of (formal) employment. The sum of these two 
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variables equals  − (. In the estimation, they are introduced separately with 
coefficients to be estimated attached to them. Bijwaard et al. (2014), who focused on 
return migration, highlighted the relevance of spells in and out of employment on 
migration duration, suggesting that models ignoring them are likely to be biased. 
5.2. Variables 
Work experience  corresponds to months in employment. Individual control variables 
 include age and months out of employment. Job characteristics  are the type of 
contract (open-ended, atypical), occupation level (apprentice, blue-collar, white-collar), 
firm size, sector of economic activity and territorial area. The size of the migrant 
community 
 is captured by the share of the migrant worker community (country of 
birth for immigrants and region of birth for internal migrants) over total regional 
employment. The indicators for local macroeconomic conditions 	
 are the change in 
the log value added by sector and region, and regional unemployment rates.
9
 
Since Italian proficiency is not available in WHIP, competence in the language 
of the host country is proxied by the linguistic distance between the native language and 
Italian. Chiswick and Miller (2005) showed in fact that linguistic distance is one of the 
determinants of proficiency. For this reason, the wage equation for immigrants includes 
the Levenshtein distance %, a continuous variable computed for each immigrant 
community (Adserà & Pytliková, 2015). Developed by the Max Planck Institute for 
Evolutionary Anthropology, this measure of linguistic distance uses the phonetic 
dissimilarity between most used words, starting from the number of steps needed to 
transform a word in one language into the same one expressed in the other language.
10
 
The distance is 0 if the languages are the same and increases the further they are. In this 
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sample, Spanish is the closest language to Italian (0.583) and Chinese the furthest 
(1.001). 
As previously mentioned, the selection equation , contains all the variables 
included in the wage equation, plus the annual GDP growth in the country of origin, and 
a synthetic GDP growth rate of potential destination countries.
11
 This second variable is 
obtained by weighting the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita in the main 
destination countries (excluding Italy) by the annual share of total migration flows in 
those countries (see Appendix A3 and Table A3 for details).  
6. Results 
The results of the selection equation are presented in Table 1. First, the immigrants’ 
probability of leaving increases the longer they stay in Italy: this is captured by the 
months spent in and out of employment, both periods with a positive and significant 
effect, proving a negative duration dependence. Second, economic growth in origin 
countries and, even more so, in other possible destinations, attracts immigrants out of 
Italy. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 summarises the results of the wage equations. For foreign immigrants, 
the results of the baseline equation are presented (column 1), along with those corrected 
for out-migration (column 2). As the DIMR coefficient is significant, the preferred 
specification is the second one. The coefficient indicates a positive correlation between 
the error terms in the out-migration decision and the wage function: unobservable 
characteristics that positively influence immigrants’ wages also positively influence 
their decision to leave Italy. Hence, ceteris paribus the ‘best and brightest’ foreign 
workers are more likely to remigrate from Italy. Without the out-migration correction, 
the wage profile for immigrants would be underestimated by more than 10%. Similar 
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findings were detected in other countries (Constant & Massey, 2003, for Germany; 
Rooth & Saarela, 2007, for Sweden; and De Haas & Fokkema, 2011, for African 
immigrants in Italy and Spain). 
[Table 2 about here] 
Most of the individual variables are significant, all with the expected sign. Age 
has a larger effect on stayers’ wages (twice the effect it has for foreign immigrants), 
while work experience has a larger impact for internal migrants. For immigrants, the 
positive coefficient of experience is reduced by more than a third by the effect of 
linguistic distance. The higher the linguistic distance, the smaller the positive effect of 
experience on immigrants’ wages is, in line with research showing the positive effect of 
language skills on labour market outcomes (Chiswick & Miller, 2015). Periods spent 
out of employment have a negative and significant effect only on stayers’ wages 
(similar to Edin & Gustavsson, 2008). 
Aggregate demand dynamics at the local level help explain the wage growth of 
the three groups of workers in different ways. Growth in local added value pushes up 
the wages of all groups, foreign immigrants being the most sensitive; regional 
unemployment, on the other hand, has a (negative) significant effect only on stayers’ 
wages.  
The migrant community has a significant and negative effect among both 
foreign immigrants and internal migrants, suggesting a negative cluster effect, namely a 
negative effect of a higher concentration of migrants from the same country/region. 
Similarly, Boeri, De Philipphis, Patacchini, and Pellizzari (2015) found that migrants 
residing in more immigrant-dense areas in Italy were less likely to be employed, and 
Hatton and Leigh (2011) and Danzer and Yaman (2013) found a negative effect on 
wages in the UK.  
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To facilitate the comparability of results and summarise wage assimilation 
patterns, the wage profiles of foreign immigrants, internal migrants and stayers have 
been built based on the estimates presented in Table 2. They are calculated for a 
‘standard individual’, who entered the labour market aged eighteen, employed as a blue-
collar worker in a small manufacturing firm in the North-West.
12
 For immigrants, the 
results for those speaking the closest language to Italian (Spanish, %=0.583) and the 
furthest one (Chinese, %=1.001) are presented, always using estimations corrected for 
out-migration. 
Figure 1 illustrates the wage assimilation profiles for the first thirteen years 
spent in Italy. Immigrant workers earn about 8% less than stayers and internal migrants 
at the beginning of their career. Time spent in Italy does not help in reducing the gap: 
over time, immigrants’ wages diverge from those of internal migrants and stayers.
13
 
After five (ten) years of work experience there is a gap of about 12% (15%) for 
Spanish-speaking immigrants, and about 16% (22%) for Chinese-speaking ones, with 
those speaking other languages falling between these two extremes. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Thus, language proximity partially reduces the gap in immigrant wages. 
However, it is far from explaining the total difference, and even for immigrants 
speaking similar languages the gap widens over time, though they are likely to improve 
their language skills and increase their social capital. Summing up, immigrants’ wages 
never align with those of internal migrants or stayers (statistically different profiles),
14
 
and this remains the case when selective out-migration is taken into account.  
During their work careers, internal migrants seem to have a worse wage profile 
than stayers do. Yet, the profiles of stayers and internal migrants are not statistically 
different from each other, in part contradicting the main conclusions of sociologists here 
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(e.g. Fofi, 1975; Pugliese, 2006), who stress the poor economic and social assimilation 
of internal migrants during the 1960s. This paper suggests, instead, that internal 
migrants were almost assimilated in terms of wages during the 1990s and early 2000s. 
These findings are coherent with the results by Mocetti and Porello (2010).
15
 
The literature has pointed to the importance for assimilation of the phase of the 
business cycle when immigrants arrive in the host country (e.g. Bratsberg, Baart, and 
Raaum, 2006) and of cohorts’ quality (e.g. Borjas, 1985). The individual fixed effects 
should already capture cohort effects. In addition, robustness checks have been 
performed controlling as an alternative for cohort fixed effects, and the results have 
been confirmed, as is the importance of linguistic distance (Figure 2).
 16 
[Figure 2 about here] 
7. The role of job segmentation 
Another explanation for the lack of wage assimilation might be the high degree of 
segmentation of the Italian labour market. Foreign workers, even highly-educated ones, 
are concentrated in low-paid and low-quality jobs (Fullin & Reyneri, 2011). Indeed, 
Dell’Aringa et al. (2015) showed that immigrants’ human capital does not help them to 
access high-paying occupations. 
This paper extends the analysis and evaluates the wage profiles of foreign 
immigrants and natives working in ‘low-wage jobs’ (LW-jobs hereafter), to disentangle 
the role of labour market segmentation in the under-assimilation of immigrants. 
First, jobs are identified by the three-digit NACE classification of sectors (168 
jobs). Then, LW-jobs are defined as those with an average wage for blue-collar workers 
and apprentices in 1987 below the first quartile (97 out of 168 jobs). In the period under 
analysis (1990–2003), 70% of the foreign workers in the sample were employed in 
these jobs, 44% of internal migrants and 39% of stayers (Appendix Table A5). Wages 
 19
in LW-jobs are 29% less than the average and the stayer–immigrant raw wage 
differential is reduced to 5% from the average of 17%. In addition to being poorly paid, 
these jobs represent a trap: most people who start working in such jobs spend their 
entire working career there and will never move to a different one – as is the case for 
76% of stayers, 84% of internal migrants and 89% of foreign immigrants. 
The wage profiles of foreign immigrants, stayers and internal migrants who 
spend their entire (observed) working career in such jobs are very similar (Figure 3, 
upper part; Appendix Table A6). After some years of experience, the wage profiles of 
stayers and internal migrants in LW-jobs are much lower than the profile of natives 
workers employed in other jobs; it is also lower with respect to native workers who start 
their career in LW-jobs, but who are able to change later on.
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[Figure 3 about here] 
Moreover, the effect of linguistic distance among people in LW-jobs is not 
significant (Appendix Table A6), showing that linguistic proximity (and probably 
linguistic proficiency) does not help in reducing the wage gap if the immigrant works in 
a LW-job. 
Instead, linguistic distance from Italian significantly worsens the immigrants’ 
probability of exiting from LW-jobs (Appendix Table A7). Also, the size of the 
immigrant community has a negative effect on the probability of exiting LW-jobs, 
confirming the negative cluster effect. Both months of employment and out of 
employment have a positive impact on leaving LW-jobs, indicating that what matters is 
total time spent in Italy. 
Both linguistic distance and job segmentation contribute to the lack of wage 
assimilation and have a similar role in explaining it: after ten years of work experience, 
the wage differences among groups of immigrants range between 5.4% (immigrants 
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never vs. always in LW-jobs) and 7.4% (immigrants with minimum vs. maximum 
linguistic distance) (Appendix Table A8). Still, even in the best-case scenario 
(minimum linguistic distance, never in LW-jobs), immigrants experience a wage gap in 
relation to stayers, suggesting that unobserved factors or discrimination also play a role 
(Figure 3, bottom part). 
8. Conclusions 
Taking advantage of the presence of both foreign immigration and internal migration in 
Italy, this paper investigates the wage assimilation patterns of male immigrants and 
internal migrants in relation to stayers, using administrative data on dependent 
employment.  
The econometric specification first corrects for selection in out-migration with a 
Heckman correction, which takes into account job opportunities at home and in other 
countries and which is newly refined with the duration of stay in the destination 
country. Then, wage equations are estimated separately for the three groups, controlling 
for individual fixed effects. For foreign immigrants, the role of linguistic proximity is 
also explored. 
The modelling of the out-migration decision highlights the temporary character 
of the immigration project in Italy and the positive selection of out-migrants.  
Findings from the wage equations show that internal migrants experience only 
minor and not significant differences from stayers. By contrast, in the long run foreign 
immigrants do not assimilate into either native group, with the gap increasing over time; 
this remains the case when controlling for out-migration. The wage gap for immigrants 
speaking languages closer to Italian increases at a slower pace than for the others, 
highlighting the role of linguistic skills in wage assimilation. However, for all 
immigrant groups the gap increases over time. 
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The lack of assimilation is partially due to labour market segmentation and to 
the concentration of foreign immigrants in low-skilled and low-wage jobs (70% vs. 39-
44% of native workers). Workers who spend their careers in these jobs have almost the 
same wage profile, no matter whether they are foreign immigrants, internal migrants or 
stayers. Moreover, they all have a low probability of progressing from such jobs, which 
is even lower for immigrants, who are also more likely to be employed in them. 
Linguistic proximity does not reduce the wage gap for immigrants in low-wage jobs, 
but it helps immigrants to leave these jobs. Labour market segmentation could also 
explain the positive selection in out-migration: the scarce job mobility for immigrants 
may encourage the more skilled to go elsewhere in search of better opportunities. Future 
research should investigate this aspect. 
Keeping in mind that these results do not have a causal interpretation, they could 
give important policy indications. Given the rapid ageing of the Italian population, 
foreign immigrants are becoming a permanently needed component of the Italian 
economy. Italy should hence invest in integration policies designed to improve 
immigrants’ linguistic skills and to prevent the segmentation of foreign workers in 
sectors where there is little chance of promotion. Better job placement services would 
help foreign immigrants find different jobs from those prevailing in the community of 
origin. In addition, a bilateral programme of pre-departure and post-arrival training 
coordinated with the countries of origin might help migrants to get a better return on 
their human capital.  
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1
 For a survey, see Del Boca and Venturini (2005). 
2
 Developed at LABORatorio Revelli (www.laboratoriorevelli.it/whip).  
3
 There is no attrition because it is compulsory for firms to provide information about 
their workers to INPS. 
4
 For an analysis of the wage gap for female immigrants in Italy, see Piazzalunga 
(2015). 
5
 This feature affects both immigrants and internal migrants.  
6
 Long-stay immigrants gained access to public employment only in 2013. 
7
 Often, this is a good proxy for the year of entrance in the country. 
8
 The summary statistics of the three groups are significantly different from each other. 
9
 Additional sources of data are described in the Appendix (Table A2). 
10
 See Adserà and Pytliková (2015) and Bakker et al. (2009) for further details. 
11
 Following the literature, there is no correction on out-migration of native people. 
First, the gross emigration rate out of Italy was around 0.1% per annum during this 
period (Bonifazi, Heins, Strozza, & Vitiello, 2009). Second, WHIP allows the authors to 
track and follow workers when they move across Italian regions (thus internal migrants 
are always followed). Finally, the likelihood of workers definitively exiting Italian 
employment is 0.5 times higher for foreign immigrants than for stayers and internal 
migrants, even when individual, job and career characteristics are controlled for 
(Appendix Table A4). 
12
 The same results hold also for the North-East. The high degree of heterogeneity 
among Italian regions in terms of both levels and dynamics of foreign and internal 
migration discourages regional disaggregated analyses. 
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13
 Figure 2 does not include periods spent outside employment, which have a negative 
effect only on stayers’ wages. 
14
 A test for common coefficient restrictions was run on a pooled regression of (a) 
immigrants and stayers, (b) immigrants and internal migrants, and (c) stayers and 
internal migrants. In (a) and (b) the null hypothesis that all the coefficients for 
immigrants are zero was rejected in both cases; in (c) the null was accepted for internal 
migrants. 
15
 In particular, Mocetti and Porello (2010) show that foreign immigration is associated 
with inflows of highly-educated internal migrants and the displacement of low-educated 
ones. 
16
 The authors estimate wage equations including cohort fixed effects (defined as year 
of entrance into the labour market), instead of individual fixed effects, and the 
interactions between cohort and experience (Figure 2). 
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Table 1. Selection equation 
 
Foreign immigrants’ probability of leaving  
Growth rate of real GDP p.c. in origin country 0.0093 *** 
 (0.0023)  
Synthetic real GDP p.c. growth rate of potential destination countries 
a
 0.0448 *** 
 (0.0096)  
Months of employment 0.0119 *** 
 (0.0021)  
Months out of employment  0.0145 *** 
 (0.0015)  
Obs. 27,924  
Log likelihood -12229.5  
χ
2
 3700.22  
Prob> χ
2
 0   
 
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; p < *** 0.01. 
It includes also all variables in wage equation (see table 2). 
a 
The index is developed as follows: for each migrant community, the growth rate of real GDP per capita 
(p.c.) weighted by the flows of migration in the destination countries other than Italy is used. Additional 
details in Appendix A3. 
































                                                                                                                                                                          
Table 2. Wage equations 
 
Log weekly wage  
Foreign immigrants 
without duration Heckman 
correction 
Foreign immigrants with 
duration Heckman 
correction Internal migrants Stayers 
 1 2 3 4 
     
Intercept 4.2665 *** 4.4132 *** 4.4935 *** 4.5044 *** 
 (0.1844)  (0.1873)   (0.128)  (0.034)  
Age 0.0309 *** 0.0301 *** 0.0421 *** 0.0527 *** 
 (0.0120)  (0.0094)   (0.008)  (0.003)  
Age sqr. -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0003 *** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001)   (0.00004)  (0.00001)  
Months of employment 0.0035 ** 0.0041 *** 0.0032 *** 0.0022 *** 
 (0.0014)  (0.0010)   (0.0006)  (0.0003)  
Months of employment sqr. -0.000004 *** -0.00001 *** -0.000009 *** -0.000007 *** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)   (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Months out of employment 0.0008  0.0011   -0.0004  -0.0006 ** 
 (0.0010)  (0.0007)   (0.0006)  (0.0003)  
Months of empl.*linguistic 
dist. -0.0014  -0.0015 **     
 (0.0009)  (0.0007)       
Log value added 0.0759 *** 0.2292 *** 0.0616 *** 0.0752 *** 
 (0.0240)  (0.0281)   (0.011)  (0.004)  
Regional unemployment rate 0.0008  -0.0012   -0.0007  -0.0022 *** 
 (0.0010)  (0.0007)   (0.001)  (0.000)  
Migrant community -3.7520 ** -6.1943 *** -1.6862 ***   
 (1.7560)  (1.6173)   (0.577)    
DIMR   0.0240 ***     
   (0.0082)       
Obs. 27,924  27,924  60,678  359,527  
F 88.9 *** 88.82 *** 701.73 *** 7193.68 *** 
Corr (u_i, Xb)   -0.4563  -0.4626  -0.2465  -0.3909  
R-sq:  within   0.3616  0.3625  0.5261  0.604  
           between  0.0688  0.0700  0.1988  0.1751  
           overall  0.1453  0.1461   0.2720   0.2665   
 
Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; p < *** 0.01. 
Controlling for type of contract, firm size, occupation, sector, and region. 













Figure 1. Experience-log wage profiles for foreign immigrants, internal migrants, and stayers  
 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 















                                                                                                                                                                          
Figure 2. Experience-log wage profiles for foreign immigrants and stayers, controlling for 
cohort fixed effects, real wages 
 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
Note: Profiles refer to blue-collar males in manufacturing in the North West entering the labour market at 
age 18. For immigrants, we plotted the profiles for those speaking the closest language (minimum 
linguistic distance). 
Cohorts correspond to two contiguous years of entrance into the labour market. 
Results of wage equations including cohort fixed effects – which allow evaluating the differences in entry 
wages by cohort – as well as the interactions between cohort and experience – which allow evaluating the 






















                                                                                                                                                                          
Figure 3. Experience-log wage profiles for foreign immigrants, internal migrants, and stayers, 
by type of job 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
Note: Profiles refer to blue-collar males in manufacturing in the North West entering the labour market at 
age 18. LW-jobs (low-wage jobs) are defined as those with an average wage for blue-collars and 
apprentices in 1987 below the first quartile. Unless otherwise specified, for immigrants average linguistic 
distance is used. 
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